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Abstract: The Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London left protection of property 
against takings for economic development to the states. Since Kelo, thirty-seven states have 
enacted legislation to update their eminent domain laws. This paper is the first to 
theoretically and empirically analyze the factors that influence whether, in what manner, and 
how quickly states change their laws through new legislation. Fourteen of the thirty-seven 
new laws offer only weak protections against development takings. The legislative response 
to Kelo was responsive to measures of the backlash but only in the binary decision whether to 
pass any new law. The decision to enact a meaningful restriction was more a function of 
relevant political economy measures. States with more economic freedom, greater value of 
new housing construction, and less racial and income inequality are more likely to have 
enacted stronger restrictions, and sooner. Of the thirteen states that have not updated, 
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Massachusetts and New York are unlikely to update ever if at all. 
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Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! 
State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash 
 
1.  Introduction 
The 5-4 decision in Kelo v. New London affirms that eminent domain is an important tool for 
local governments in the redevelopment and revitalization of economically distressed areas.… 
Judicious use of eminent domain is critical to the economic growth and development of cities 
and towns throughout the country. 
International Economic Development Council1 
 
Within the last fifty years, “public use” has been interpreted more broadly to be “public 
purpose,” which is subsequently reinterpreted by public officials as “public benefit” and has 
now become a primary vehicle for transferring property rights and ownership from one 
private owner to another…. [I]n some cases eminent domain has become a tool of first resort 
(and sometimes the only tool). 
Reason Public Policy Foundation2 
 
For more than a century our jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive 
scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs 
justify the use of the takings power.… Clearly there is no basis for exempting economic 
development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose…. We emphasize 
that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise 
of the takings power. 
STEVENS, J. for majority of the Kelo Court3 
 
 
Public use and just compensation are the most commonly discussed protections of individual 
rights against the takings power, but another potentially important check is federalism. Although the 
Kelo ruling in June 2005 created no new law, nearly all the state legislatures have since considered 
changing their eminent domain laws. As of June 2008 bills to further restrict eminent domain powers 
had been passed in 38 legislatures and were enacted in 37 of those states.4 Six of those 37 states also 
enacted reforms by direct or mixed democracy mechanisms, such as citizen initiatives and legislative 
referenda. Four additional states have enacted laws only by popular vote, so a total of 41 states have 
passed some kind of reform in response to the Kelo ruling. Voters and commentators decried the 
perceived injustice of the Kelo ruling, which ignited a national backlash of popular support for 
                                                 
1 “Eminent Domain Resource Kit,” prepared by the International Economic Development Council, accessed online 
at www.iedconline.org, June 20, 2006. 
2 Staley and Blair (2005). 
3 Kelo et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) at 12-16. 
4 Governors in New Mexico, Arizona, and Iowa vetoed bills in 2006. The Iowa legislature over rode the veto, and 
New Mexico passed separate legislation in 2007. 
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property rights. It was with great zeal that state legislators took up Justice Stevens’ invitation to 
further limit eminent domain powers. 
However, these new eminent domain laws do not necessarily increase protection of 
individual rights against economic development takings. The Supreme Court left such protection to 
the states’ political systems, which are run by fallible policymakers subject to swells of public 
opinion and pressure by organized interests. Since economic development takings are a form of 
wealth transfer that attract political competition, rational policymakers balance competing interests 
according to their relative abilities to exert political pressure. Whether these state laws further restrict 
eminent domain, and in what manner, are empirical questions. While the legislative response to Kelo 
has been addressed in much recent research, this is the first paper to investigate empirically the 
political-economic determinants of how the state legislatures responded to the Kelo backlash. 
We first evaluate each of the new laws and categorize the states according to whether they 
changed their eminent domain law by legislation, and if so whether the changes were largely 
symbolic—enacting only weak restrictions—or instead meaningful constraints on development 
takings. We then estimate limited-dependent-variable and duration models to determine the political-
economic factors that influence the legislative responses. We find that whether a state updates its law 
is influenced by observed measures of the intensity of the Kelo backlash and the collective action 
costs of local governments. However, deciding on a meaningful versus symbolic change, and the 
timing of the new laws, are determined by a state’s history of economic liberty, the value of new 
housing construction, and racial and income inequality. The legislative responses are not empirically 
determined by measures of policymaker behavior, such as corruption or dependence on property 
taxes, or presidential voting patterns, population density, and political institutions. 
The race and income effects are of particular relevance to concerns that economic 
development takings systematically harm the poor and non-white segments of society. When 
choosing sites for economic development plans, policymakers may prefer to target poor areas 
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because they are where the public-interest need for development is greatest. However, buyouts in 
minority and poor areas are prone to escalate to condemnation proceedings because property values 
are lower, so subjective value is relatively high and just compensation is relatively low. The poor are 
also less able to mount political resistance to takings. Many critics of the Kelo decision, including 
Justice Clarence Thomas in his dissenting opinion, point out these income and racial effects.5 An 
important question that we take up in this paper is to what extent, if any, legislative responses to Kelo 
serve to alleviate the bias of development takings against minorities and the poor. In the next section, 
we discuss a rational choice basis for expecting little of such alleviation, and in the sections that 
follow we report findings in support of that. 
2.  Theoretical Motivation: Collective Institutional Choice 
Like other political institutions, eminent domain laws are intended to constrain, or otherwise 
alter, policymakers’ choice sets. Some states have loose statutory restrictions on eminent domain 
power. For example, New York’s law, which dates to 1978 and was not modified after Kelo, 
enumerates eminent domain powers and specifies bureaucratic procedures (for holding public 
hearings, determining just compensation, etc.) but does not otherwise state restrictions on 
condemning authorities’ powers.6 Elsewhere, states impose statutory restrictions on policymakers but 
                                                 
5 See THOMAS, J., dissenting, Kelo et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) at 17-18: “The 
consequences of today’s decision are not difficult to predict, and promise to be harmful. So-called ‘urban renewal’ 
programs provide some compensation for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective 
value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. 
Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of 
public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall 
disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands 
to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful. If ever there were justification for 
intrusive judicial review of constitutional provisions that protect ‘discrete and insular minorities,’ United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938), surely that principle would apply with great force to the 
powerless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects. The deferential standard this Court has adopted for 
the Public Use Clause is therefore deeply perverse. It encourages ‘those citizens with disproportionate influence and 
power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms’ to victimize the weak. Ante, at 
11 (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting).” 
6 New York relies on judicial review to constrain eminent domain powers. Current precedent interprets economic 
development as public use (see discussion in López and Totah 2007). The statute is Laws of New York, “Eminent 
Domain Procedure Law,” accessed online February 25, 2007, at public.leginfo.state.ny.us. Section 103, Paragraph 
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allow generous exemptions and loopholes. For example, in states where “blight” is defined 
expansively, it is easier for condemning authorities to satisfy public use requirements.7 Where 
exemptions are initially narrow in scope, local officials tend to mine loopholes to loosen restrictions 
over time. 
Beginning in the late 1800s court decisions have incrementally expanded takings power (Ely 
2005). Through deference to legislative bodies, the judiciary has allowed a gradual expansion of 
public use to encompass broad economic benefits such as the elimination of blight by urban 
renewal8, protection of land competition9, jobs and growth10, and the well-intentioned democratic 
planning of economic development11. Beginning in the 1980s local governments have taken an 
increased role in centrally planning local and regional economic development. The list of projects is 
readily familiar: office parks, sports arenas, casinos, auto assembly plants, mixed-use communities 
and so on. Over time, these types of projects have gradually joined more traditional land use policies 
made by state and local governments, such as rights of way for common carriers, environmental 
conservation, and recreation space. All these projects compete for relatively large tracts of land, 
which often must be pieced together of dozens or even hundreds of contiguous properties. Private 
developers have a long and well-documented history of successfully assembling contiguous 
properties through market transactions (Benson 2005). But with the gradual expansion of public use, 
developers began to realize new options for partnering with local governments in land acquisition. 
Developers could now weigh the transaction costs of dealing with scores of property owners against 
the bureaucratic and rent seeking costs of forging long-term relationships with land use officials. Not 
                                                                                                                                                             
(G) states: “‘Public project’ means any program or project for which acquisition of property may be required for a 
public use, benefit or purpose.” 
7 Examples of states with broad exemptions and loopholes include Alabama, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Texas, 
Vermont and Wisconsin. For detailed discussion, see Sandefur (2006), Somin (2007), López and Totah (2007) or 
López, Kerekes and Johnson (2007). 
8 Berman et al. v. Parker et al., 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
9 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
10 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W. 2d 455 (1981). 
11 Kelo et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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only do local governments tend to sweeten deals with tax increment financing and other subsidies, 
but the power of eminent domain serves as an expedient tool in forcing out extant property owners. 
From 1998 through 2002, over 10,000 properties in 41 states were threatened or condemned for 
transfer to other private parties (Berliner 2003).12 
But it had been half a century since the last major Supreme Court case (Berman v. Parker in 
1954) involving the displacement of large numbers of property owners for apparent private gain. The 
general public was relatively oblivious to the increasing emergence of development takings. Then 
came the Kelo decision in June 2005. It is no wonder the ruling came as such a shock and created 
much controversy. The Supreme Court put states on notice that Kelo-style development takings are 
the law of the land, and a plurality of states were compelled to establish a different threshold. 
The states have adjusted in similar ways to previous federal baseline protections of personal 
property rights. According to Hynes, Malani and Posner (2004), the federal Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 established generous (relative to most states) property exemption levels to protect debtors in 
bankruptcy cases. The Act gave the states the option of defaulting to the federal baseline protections 
or enacting legislation to opt out. In all, 37 states opted out, the most likely being states with less 
generous exemptions than the federal baseline, relatively high bankruptcy rates, and less 
redistribution to the poor. In a similar fashion, Kelo was an external shock to the states’ equilibrium 
policies. In response, the states that preferred to restrict development takings more than the Kelo-
established federal baseline would be the most likely to update their laws, impose more meaningful 
restrictions, and do so sooner. 
Although each of the new eminent domain laws is unique, most employ some combination of 
similar provisions. Some states have relatively strict eminent domain laws. South Dakota and New 
Mexico passed laws that simply ban takings for economic development, with no exemptions or 
                                                 
12 Somin (2004) reports that between 3.5 and 4 million people have been dislocated under federally funded urban 
renewal programs since the late 1940’s. 
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loopholes.13 Other states try to narrowly define “public use” or “blight.” For example, Florida’s new 
law expressly excludes economic development from its definition of public use, and Georgia 
prohibits aesthetic considerations in determining blight. Another common provision is to require the 
condemning authority to pay some percentage premium above fair market value as just 
compensation. 
For purposes of selecting the empirical specification, it is important to recognize these 
legislative responses as each state’s collective choice. Suppose a state has loose restrictions due to 
past loophole mining or a New York-style court ruling. Suppose further that takings for private 
transfer have become routine, even though condemning authorities follow necessary procedures of 
notification, transparency, and compensation. Then Kelo sounds the wake up call. Property owners in 
the state and property rights advocates may begin to react negatively and vociferate their objection to 
these takings. The news media may begin to run more frequent and detailed stories. Citizen action 
groups will form. Busses filled with demonstrators might visit the statehouse. Economic developers 
and local governments will present their side of the issue. Legislators will face increasing pressure 
under coalescing public opinion. Bills will be introduced and debated, amended and passed, and 
perhaps signed into law.  
Something generally like that process occurred in the states’ legislative responses to the Kelo 
ruling. In equilibrium, legislators enact the policies and institutions that achieve optimal wealth 
redistribution under prevailing political support and opposition (e.g. Peltzman 1976). Development 
takings transfer wealth from property owners to planners and developers. Therefore, in response to 
Kelo the legislatures had to decide whether and how strictly to constrain local policymakers in order 
to achieve the optimal in development takings. It is important to note that doing nothing may be the 
equilibrium-achieving choice, effectively adopting the federal baseline. 
                                                 
13 New Mexico’s version of this strict law was vetoed by Governor Bill Richardson in 2006. New Mexico enacted 
less strict legislation in 2007. 
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In this paper, we approach the issue as one of institutional choice where the state legislature 
is the unit of decision. A great deal of research has examined states’ choices on political 
institutions.14 Public choice theory provides an outline of useful factors to consider in modeling 
collective choice of political institutions. Legislators respond to the political costs and benefits of 
their actions, which in turn are influenced by interest groups in proportion to their collective action 
costs.15 It bears emphasizing that state policymakers are deciding how to constrain the powers of 
local policymakers. Thus, we treat local governments as a potential interest group seeking to 
influence the legislature’s choice. 
Status quo politics is likely to feature prominently in the legislatures’ responses. Swells of 
popular support for attenuating policymaker power tend to be ephemeral, such as the tax revolt of the 
1930s, the term limits and regulatory takings movements in the 1990s, and perhaps the ongoing Kelo 
property rights backlash (the endurance of which remains to be seen). This is not to say that popular 
uprisings fail to have long term effects; for example, some organizations currently advocating for 
lower taxes had their beginnings in the 1930s. In response to a public outcry, legislators have a strong 
incentive to do something, if only for the appearance of listening to constituents’ demands. Uncertain 
what depth the Kelo backlash might have, rational legislators may be inclined to establish political 
equilibrium via bark-no-bite legislation that comes wrapped in symbolic reassurances to an outraged 
populace (Edelman 1964, 1971). Thus, a new law does not necessarily mean that development 
takings have been restricted. Legislators may also wish to obfuscate the effects of the new laws in 
order to avoid appearances of corruption (Boylan and Long 2003).  
                                                 
14 See for example Shughart and Tollison (1985) on corporate chartering, Besley and Case (1995) on gubernatorial 
term limits, Hanssen (2002) on judicial selection, de Figueiredo (2003) on line item veto, Stratmann (2004) on 
campaign finance and ballot access, and López and Jewell (2007) on congressional term limits. 
15 Theoretical contributions to the interest group model include Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), 
McCormick and Tollison (1981) and Denzau and Munger (1986). For discussion see Tollison (1988) and Mueller 
(2003). Our focus is on legislation at the state level. For state data and analysis of direct democracy and 
constitutional amendments, as well as legislation, see Somin (2008). 
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Policy outcomes exhibit bias in racially and economically fragmented polities. In general, 
fragmented electorates feature more redistribution of wealth (there being no impetus for 
redistribution in a homogeneous society). As ethnic and economic minority groups grow in size and 
number they can earn rents on their representatives’ relative ability to win redistributionist coalitions. 
Their incumbents, for example, enjoy greater electoral security independent of performance. In data 
on U.S. cities, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (2000) find that greater ethnic fragmentation means that 
more political conflicts are resolved along racial cleavages, thereby supporting greater wealth 
redistribution and greater obfuscation (in the form of public employment rather than spending). 
Similarly, Glaeser and Saks (2006) find that corruption of public officials is greater in U.S. states 
with greater racial fragmentation. Similar theoretical and empirical results support counterpart effects 
of income inequality. Takings, especially for economic development, disproportionately redistribute 
from poor and ethnic property owners (or tenants). 
To sum up, we model the states’ legislative processes in choosing whether, how and when to 
reform eminent domain laws. Legislators may be prone to symbolic politics due to the intensity of 
the popular backlash (perhaps assuming it is ephemeral). Interest groups will attempt to influence the 
institutional choice. And the institutional choice is expected to reflect the underlying political-
economic character of each state. Racial and income inequality should influence the legislatures’ 
responses, as should the profile of prevailing policies that protect individual rights, voter attitudes, 
and political institutions. 
3.  Categorization of the Dependent Variable 
We present three alternatives for quantifying states’ choices. First a dichotomous coding is 
used to indicate whether a state enacted a change to its eminent domain laws. For the 37 states that 
have updated their eminent domain laws as of June 2008, the variable Law Enact is coded 1 and 0 
otherwise. The state-by-state breakdown and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. In Section 
5.1 below we report probit estimates of marginal effects on Law Enact, and later in Section 5.5 we 
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compare findings against an alternative variable that counts all 41 states that enacted any type of 
reform. 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
Second, a multi-category coding is used to capture variation in the type of laws enacted. We 
qualitatively analyze each of the new state laws. In general, laws that do little to restrict takings 
power feature vague and encompassing definitions for “blight” and “public use.” Weak or symbolic 
laws also give broad deference to local legislative majorities. Strong laws that meaningfully restrict 
takings for private use contain some sort of prohibition on development takings, without much in the 
way of exemptions or loopholes, while otherwise allowing takings for traditional uses (e.g. common 
carriage rights of way). 
Within this general framework, we surveyed each law on a battery of 18 criteria each 
designed to elicit a “yes” or “no” response (see Appendix). For example, Criterion 1 was “does the 
law prohibit the use of eminent domain for promoting tax base, jobs, or economic development?” We 
found that the answer is “yes” for 23 of the 37 laws surveyed. Criteria 2 through 10 are similar in that 
a “yes” response indicates that this aspect of the law restricts eminent domain. In contrast, Criterion 
11 captures a loophole effect by asking “does the law restrict takings ‘solely’ or ‘primarily’ for 
economic development?” We found that the answer is “yes” for six of the 37 laws. Criteria 12 
through 18 capture similar factors by which the law becomes weaker in restricting takings power. 
With responses to all 18 criteria in hand, and assuming equal weights, we take the sum of Criteria 1-
10 and subtract the sum of Criteria 11-18. A sensible and systematic pattern emerges. Of the 37 state 
laws, 14 have a net sum less than or equal to zero, which we interpret to mean the law does little or 
nothing to restrict takings power. The remaining 23 states have a net sum greater than zero, which 
indicates that the law does enact some restriction on takings power. The variable Law Type is coded 
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{0, 1, 2} for states that enacted {none, weak, meaningful} restrictions on development takings.16 
Table 1 reports the data and descriptive statistics. The estimator used on Law Type is ordered probit. 
Later in the paper, we compare estimates on Law Type against two alternative measures of the 
stringency of the new laws. 
Our third coding of the dependent variable captures the timing of the enactment. Some states 
were quick to respond to the Kelo backlash. In fact, several state legislatures began work on the issue 
even before the June 2005 ruling, and further changes are still being considered in some states at the 
time of this writing. The variable Law Days measures the number of days between January 1, 2005, 
and the time of enactment (specifically, the date of gubernatorial signature), with right truncation at 
926 days.17 The number of days at right truncation is equivalent to two and a half years from January 
1, 2005, or approximately two years from the date of the Kelo ruling. As of June 2008, the last state 
to update was Nevada on May 23, 2007, or 874 days. We use a Weibull distribution hazard model to 
estimate the effect of covariates on Law Days, with details discussed in Section 5.3 below. In Section 
5.5, we compare estimates on Law Days with an alternative measure based on legislative session 
days. 
4.  Independent Variables 
We discuss four sets of independent variables that are expected to influence a state’s choice 
on eminent domain restrictions. Table 2 presents all variable descriptions and summary statistics. 
[TABLE 2 about here] 
4.1 Backlash Variables 
The first set of variables measures intensity of the Kelo backlash by state. Some states do not 
have a history of development takings at all, while in others the eminent domain power has become a 
routine tool of economic development, which makes the issue more likely to be on property-owning 
                                                 
16 Please see the Appendix for further discussion of the qualitative analysis and coding for all criteria by state. 
17 A few states began debating the issue even in anticipation of the Kelo decision. We begin at January 1, 2005, to 
allow for the probability that states might update the law prior to the issuance of the ruling. 
 11
voters’ minds. The variable ED9802 measures the number of economic development takings cases 
per 100,000 people by state, cumulative for the years 1998 through 2002 (Berliner 2003). After the 
Kelo decision in June 2005, there were many reports of emboldened local policy makers taking 
greater numbers of properties for private use.18 To capture the extent of this emboldening effect, the 
variable ED0506 counts takings cases per 100,000 people for one year beginning June 30, 2005. In 
addition, there was a public outcry that was fueled by much media attention. In the year following the 
decision, about four times as many news stories covered eminent domain than the previous year 
(López, Kerekes and Johnson 2007). The variable Newspapers contains each state’s count of major 
newspaper stories in the Lexis/Nexis database for the period January 1, 2004, through September 15, 
2006, searching keywords eminent domain, legislation, and legislature.  
4.2 Policy and Policymaker Variables 
The observed takings power in a state may be expected to vary with other measures of 
policymaker incentives and constraints. For example, where local policymakers already regulate 
private property more heavily they may lobby harder against further restrictions on their takings 
power. Proponents of development takings routinely list enhancing the tax base as one of their top 
justifications. And in the menu of policy options, eminent domain is a substitute for regulation, 
which affects property values and tax revenues.19 Unfortunately, we have not been able to identify a 
data source that measures such regulation by state. Instead, we use Property Tax_Local, which 
measures thousands of local property tax dollars per capita in 2003-04. Another possible substitute is 
Commute Times, average minutes commuting to work, which tend to increase (in some cases by 
policy design) with more interventionist land regulation. 
Rent seeking and corruption are likely to play a role since more corrupt governments are 
more prone to rent seeking and less compliant with procedural restraints. On first glance, one might 
                                                 
18 See Berliner (2006) and López and Totah (2007) for examples. 
19 See Fischel (2004) for a detailed description, arguing that policymakers are sensitive to the implicit price of 
takings and to the cross-price of substitution with zoning regulation. 
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think more corrupt governments would be unlikely to restrict their own takings power. On the other 
hand, with more corrupt local officials state policymakers may be under greater pressure to clamp 
down on eminent domain abuse. To capture the state’s history of government corruption, we use the 
variable Corruption Rate, which measures federal convictions of state and local officials per 1,000 
capita averaged over the years 1976-2002 (Glaeser and Saks 2006). Local governments will face 
greater collective action costs in states with high numbers of localities. And the evidence suggests 
that those governments practicing development takings (thus presumably opposing restrictions on 
them) are minority in number. To capture this effect, the variable N_Local Governments measures 
the number of local governments per capita in each state. 
Finally, our dependent variables are likely to be related to the state’s protection of individual 
liberty in other policy areas. In some places state and local governments are accustomed to high 
taxation, heavy regulation of labor and product markets, and other policies attenuating rights. Their 
legislatures may be less inclined to restrict takings power. The 2004 edition of Economic Freedom of 
North America provides the data (Karabegovich and McMahon 2006). The index rates each state on 
a 10-point scale with a higher score indicating greater economic freedom. We use the “subnational” 
categorization, which measures the influence of state and local, but not federal, governments. The 
variable Economic Freedom is each state’s average overall score for the period 1981-2003, which we 
then rescale to 100-point range for clarity of interpreting marginal effects. We expect states with a 
history of greater economic freedom to enact stronger restrictions on development takings after Kelo. 
4.3 States’ Political Economy Variables 
Next, any legislation is influenced by the underlying political, demographic, and economic 
characteristics of the polity. Property owners have a long history of influencing public policy (Fischel 
2001), and the home building industry has been a vociferous opponent of development takings at the 
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federal level.20 Where housing values are high, home owners and builders have more to lose under 
strong takings power. We estimate measures of the housing stock (Housing Price Index) and also 
flow (Housing Value and FDIC Home Loans Value). Based on Fischel’s “home voter” hypothesis, 
we expect these housing value measures to influence stronger restrictions on the takings power. 
For racial inequality we use the percent of non-white citizens (Race Percent Non-White) and 
a racial concentration index among ethnicities identified by Census data (Race Diversity Index).21 
Our variable Income Inequality is the product of the percent of families below $25,000 and above 
$100,000 annual income, capturing mass in the income distribution tails. As discussed in Section 2 
we expect greater racial and income inequality to negatively influence whether, how strongly, and 
when to restrict takings power. 
Voter attitudes also influence legislation. The Kelo backlash emerged as a swell of popular 
support for individual rights. In terms of the popular swell, the backlash is similar to populist 
movements at the turn of the twentieth century that resulted in initiatives, recall, direct election of 
U.S. senators, and other provisions to constrain representative democracy. As advocacy for 
individual rights, the backlash shares similarities with the 1990s term limits movement, which also 
resulted in widespread institutional change.22 The Kelo backlash was motivated largely by a respect 
for home and business ownership. We expect that these preferences will naturally be stronger in 
some states than in others. Presidential vote scores are a common measure of these types of voter 
attitudes. To focus on the popular swell, we track the state’s recent history of supporting third party 
                                                 
20 The National Association of Home Builders and National Association of Realtors filed amici curiae with the Kelo 
Court. See Pickel (2005), expressing concern for the relative position of new home construction under expanded 
takings power: “[The] NAHB recognizes that housing will almost never afford a community with the economic 
development benefits that a commercial application will. If economic development as a sole justification for public 
use is decided using a rational basis test with deference to local legislative bodies, then the door is left open for local 
governments to abuse their eminent domain powers and take developable land from NAHB members as they could 
from any other property owner.” (Pickel 2005, 1). 
21 The groups are the Census Bureau categories Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native American, and White. 
22 About half the states limited terms of state legislators. Many imposed or modified gubernatorial term limits. Also 
about half voted to limit terms of their own members of Congress, but these laws were overturned in the 1995 
Supreme Court case, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton. See López (2002; 2003) and López and Jewell (2007) for 
discussion. 
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presidential candidates. The variable Third Party Voting is the percent of statewide vote won by all 
non-Republican and non-Democrat candidates, averaged for the five presidential elections beginning 
1988. We expect voters who support third parties to have stronger attitudes toward protecting private 
property against takings. 
Finally, to control for density issues, we include the percent of the land that is rural (Land 
Percent Rural) and the population per square mile (Population Density). The main use of rural land 
is agriculture, which typically does not employ large numbers of people nor generate large amounts 
of tax revenue. And redevelopment agencies typically are not planned for rural areas, so the support 
for Kelo-level takings power is lower to begin with. 
4.4 Political organization and institutions 
As with any legislation, eminent domain laws are likely to be influenced by political 
organization and institutions within the state. We use a familiar set of control variables that includes: 
a dummy variable for whether the governor and legislature are controlled by the same party (Unified 
Government); the number of legislators per capita (Legislature Size); and the size of the senate 
relative to the house (Legislature Ratio); all of which are well established in the public choice 
literature (e.g., Gilligan and Matsusaka 2006). 
 
5.  Results 
The above Sections 2 and 4 are important theoretical guides for specifying the empirical 
model. However, there are too many independent variables and combinations thereof to report 
findings on all possible or even interesting factors that can be investigated. Space limitations are one 
constraint, but there are modeling constraints as well. To narrow our choice of results to report, we 
begin by discussing two specification issues presented by the data. 
First, we expect ex ante that our dependent variables are endogenous with Newspapers and 
ED0506. The argument is intuitive: local officials became emboldened after Kelo to take more 
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properties for development purposes. In states where local officials did not expect a new restrictive 
law, the emboldening effect may have resulted in greater takings. If this is the case then ED0506 and 
Law Enact would be endogenously determined. The same is likely to be the case with the variable 
Newspapers since more news attention is observed when the legislature is working on an issue and, 
in turn, legislators will be more likely to focus on an issue the more news attention it receives. In 
contrast, there is no expectation that the dependent variables will feed back into the value of ED9802 
because that variable measures a state’s history of takings. We expect the most reliable specification 
will include ED9802 as a historical instrument for the severity of the Kelo backlash. 
A second specification problem arises with degrees of freedom and our small sample size. 
With a cross section of 50 observations, model fit and stability are both sensitive to selection of the 
independent variables. Certain specifications that we tried either failed to converge or provided 
unstable estimates (all unreported results are available on request). This type of problem is common 
in cross-sectional estimates on the U.S. states (e.g., Glaeser and Saks 2006; López and Jewell 
2007).23 To achieve a reliable set of results, we make every attempt at parsimony in specifying the 
models, including as few covariates as needed to satisfy theoretical significance while focusing on 
the variables that are robust predictors under many different specifications. 
Given the foregoing space and modeling constraints, we have decided to report only the few 
most important models for each of the three dependent variables. Results on Law Enact, Law Type 
and Law Days appear respectively in Tables 3 through 5. To broadly preview what follows, we find 
that the decision simply whether to update (Law Enact) follows a somewhat different empirical 
                                                 
23 Glaeser and Saks (2006, p.1062) state, in regard to their findings on corruption rates across the states: “An 
important caveat to these results…is that they are based on a cross-section of states with at most fifty observations. 
Due to this small number of degrees of freedom and the high degree of correlation among various other variables 
that could be potentially used as controls, our results are somewhat sensitive to which other variables are included in 
the regression. We have chosen this set of controls because they provide a relatively parsimonious way of capturing 
other economic factors that might be correlated with…our independent variables of interest. While the statistical 
significance of these results depends on the specification chosen, the signs and magnitudes of the effects are 
relatively similar across a broad set of alternative control variables. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the direction 
and magnitude of our estimates, and do not place too much weight on the statistical significance of any given 
result.” 
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process than the decisions on symbolic vs. meaningful reform (Law Type) or the timing of the update 
(Law Days). To simply pass any law, the observed variation is driven primarily by the backlash and 
collective action variables. The historical number of takings, number of local governments, and value 
of new housing account for most of the explanatory power of Law Enact. But Law Type is 
empirically influenced by the economic freedom index, the flow dollar measures of new housing, and 
the income inequality and racial diversity measures. The timing of the update, Law Days, is also 
driven by the housing and inequality measures and, to a lesser extent, by economic freedom. 
5.1 Probit Results on Law Enact 
Table 3 reports results from a probit estimation including robust standard errors for five 
specifications. For ease of interpretation, we report the estimated marginal effects (rather than the 
estimated coefficients) for all results in the paper.24 With the exception of Model 2, model fit appears 
to good as shown by the pseudo-R2 values and significant Chi2 values. In general none of the 
political organization variables is significant, and neither are many of the policy variables or state 
characteristics. Rather, the key explanatory variables are the backlash and collective action variables. 
The likelihood of a state updating its law increases with a greater history of more development 
takings (ED9802), a greater value of new home construction, and more local governments per capita. 
To a lesser extent economic freedom also matters. However, measures of racial and income 
inequality, property taxes, commute times, corruption, third party voting, and density are statistically 
insignificant in most specifications. We now discuss key explanatory variables in turn. 
[TABLE 3 about here] 
The backlash variables Newspapers and ED9802 are positive and significant. Given our 
strong expectation that Newspapers is endogenous with Law Enact, we will avoid interpreting much 
from this result (Model 1 is included mainly for illustrative purposes). Although these results cannot 
                                                 
24 The marginal effects and standard errors in Table 3 are generated using the STATA dprobit command (Statacorp 
2005). 
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be used to infer causation, the significance of a given variable does imply correlation. For instance, 
ED9802, our historical instrument for the incidence of development takings, is positive and 
significant with a sizeable marginal effect in Models 2-5. This implies that an increase of one takings 
case per thousand population is associated with an increase in the probability of updating by between 
2.4 and 2.8 percent. This result invites a fairly straightforward interpretation: in states where 
development takings have been more common, property owners perceive a greater threat to their own 
properties and have a greater demand for legislators to do something, a demand which that state’s 
legislators respond to by updating the law. A similar effect is found with the result on Housing 
Permits, which is also positive and significant. Another million dollars in authorized new home 
construction increases the probability of an update by an estimated 2.3 to 3.3 percent. In other 
(unreported) specifications using Housing Price Index, the stock value of housing is not significant. 
Legislatures appear responsive to interests that align with homebuilders but not necessarily with 
owners of existing homes. Homebuilders and realtors were vociferous opponents to Kelo and there is 
evidence that their interests were represented in the state legislative responses. The estimates on 
Economic Freedom are positive and statistically significant with comparatively small marginal 
effects. A one-unit increase in the economic freedom index increases the predicted probability of a 
new law by between an estimated 2.5 and 4.1 percent. Thus, we can conclude that states with a 
history of economic liberty—low taxes and spending, lenient regulation and protection of individual 
rights—are also more likely to update their laws after Kelo. Finally, N_Local Governments is 
positive and significant. This result is not surprising, since any local government that might want to 
maintain broad takings powers faces greater collective action costs in organizing to influence 
legislation when there are more local governments to organize.  
The political control variables have no explanatory power. This is somewhat surprising since 
in much previous research these political institutions variables do influence legislation (e.g., Gilligan 
and Matsusaka 2006). This “non-result” may derive from collective choice considerations discussed 
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earlier, that efforts to limit eminent domain have been heavily grassroots. Independent of the existing 
political rules and reality, it may be that an electorate either agitated to limit eminent domain or it did 
not, seemingly regardless of the political institutions that typically affect whether legislation passes. 
These results do not suggest otherwise.  
Other non-results may be surprising from the standpoint of theoretical significance. Property 
Tax, for example, is statistically insignificant whether using state or local taxes on either per capita or 
percent of revenue bases, regardless of specification and estimator (as will be apparent in Tables 4 
and 5). On the one hand this non-result should be surprising. Proponents of development takings 
stress that eminent domain powers are critical to property values and tax base. Thus, regulators who 
rely more on property taxes would ex ante seem to have a strong interest in broad takings power. But 
this relationship fails to appear in the current data set. In addition, our motivation for using this 
variable was to proxy the degree of land-use regulation. Property taxes evidently do a poor job as 
such a proxy, or act as a second order effect due to aggregation or measurement errors. Corruption 
Rate and Commute Time also play no discernible empirical roles. Because the corruption variable 
measures federal arrest rates, it may reflect the state’s political standing among federal policymakers, 
particularly in the executive branch, more than it does the state’s latent political-economic realities. 
The actual or near sacking of dozens of US Attorneys in the spring of 2007 (Eggen and Goldstein 
2007), followed by its dramatic political fallout, strongly suggest that the fervor and priorities with 
which a U.S. Attorney approaches her job are closely watched at the highest levels of the federal 
political order. It is possible that corrupt officials are more likely to engage in economic development 
takings, but this does not extend to a greater likelihood of being prosecuted by U.S. attorneys 
operating under politicized incentives. The commuting variable might be capturing scattered 
information of second-order import. Commute times are the end product of many influences 
including natural conditions (geography and topography), citizen preferences (e.g. amenities of 
density versus space), variance in school quality, and policy variables like smart growth and taxes. 
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The finding that Income Inequality and Racial Diversity are not statistically significant 
(except in model 1) may also be surprising. Given that development takings usually occur in minority 
and low-income areas, and these populations are relatively weak in influencing the legislative 
process in general, we would expect states with greater inequality to be less likely to update. As we 
will discuss in the next section, however, inequality and diversity play more important roles once we 
distinguish between weak versus meaningful laws. 
5.2 Ordered Probit Results on Law Type  
As discussed above, the variable Law Type is a trichotomous limited-dependent variable 
(LDV) taking on the values {0, 1, 2} to indicate {none, weak, meaningful} updates to eminent 
domain restrictions. Thirty-seven states take a value greater than zero, of which 14 enacted weak or 
symbolic laws and 23 meaningful (see Appendix and discussion in Section 3 above). We consider 
two potential strategies to estimate the effect of the independent variables on Law Type: ordered and 
unordered LDV models. 
Under certain assumptions, Law Type can be considered an ordered LDV. Specifically, we 
can assume that whether and what type of law passes indicate a polity’s latent preference to limit 
takings power. The stronger the underlying desire, the higher the probability of passing a meaningful 
law. In more formal terms, we can assume that state i has a demand for restrictions on development 
takings, Di, and that this demand takes on a linear form: 
(1) Di = Ωiβ + εi, 
where Di is the actual amount of restrictions that the ith state desires. The vector Ωi contains the 
independent variables for the ith state, the vector β contains coefficients to be estimated, and εi is the 
error term. However, Di is an unobserved (latent) variable, since the researcher only observes discrete 
outcomes. In the case of Law Type, the outcome is observed with the following decision rule: 
(2) χi = 1 (no update)   if Di ≤ ∆1,  
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  χi = 2 (weak update)  if ∆1 < Di ≤ ∆2, and 
  χi = 3 (meaningful update)  if Di > ∆2, 
where ∆1 and ∆2 are cutoff points to be estimated. If ε is normally distributed, equations (1) and (2) 
imply that the demand for eminent domain restrictions can be estimated using an ordered probit 
model. 
On the other hand, one could assume that Law Type is an unordered LDV. This assumption 
has some appeal, especially if states pass weak laws as substitutes for strong laws. However, an 
unordered LDV estimation model has some drawbacks, the most important of which in the present 
case is that unordered LDV models are degrees-of-freedom intensive. Specifically, if J equals the 
number of unordered categories, an unordered LDV model estimates J–1 different β vectors, while 
an ordered model estimates only one β vector. Given the limitations of our data in terms of sample 
size, we choose to utilize the ordered model.25 
[TABLE 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports ordered probit estimates on the same specification as Model 5 from Table 3. 
In Table 4 we report two types of marginal effects. In Columns 2 and 3 are the estimated 
“instantaneous” marginal effects (the estimated slope of the probability function) and the standard 
errors of the predictions produced by the STATA mfx command (StataCorp 2005). The values are 
interpreted as changes in the probability of each Law Type outcome given a marginal change in the 
independent variable evaluated at sample means. An alternative way to analyze marginal effects is to 
simulate changes in each independent variable. Column 4 reports changes in the probability of each 
outcome given a one standard deviation increase in each independent variable, and Column 5 
                                                 
25 In general terms, ordered probit can be thought of as unordered (i.e. multinomial) probit assuming that the J–1 β 
vectors for each potential outcome are the same (sometimes called “the parallel regression assumption”). This 
assumption can be tested using a likelihood-ratio test (Wolfe and Gould, 1998). The results from such a test on the 
alternative specifications show that the parallel regression assumption holds for our sample. Although this test does 
not directly test for the appropriateness of an ordered versus unordered model, it does suggest that the results would 
be approximately the same. Indeed, unreported estimates from multinomial probit models show this to be true 
(available on request). 
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presents bootstrapped confidence intervals for the estimates in Column 4.26 In addition to interpreting 
magnitude, the other important advantage of Table 4 is the ability to isolate the influences on weak 
change as distinct from meaningful change. Consider, for example, the effect of economic freedom 
as reported by the marginal effect estimates in Column 2. Economic Freedom is negative and 
significant in the category Law Type = 0, not significant in category 1, and positive and significant in 
category 2. Thus, states with a greater history of economic liberty were more likely to enact new 
legislation—specifically meaningful as opposed to symbolic laws. An increase of one unit on the 
{1,100} scale of Economic Freedom correlates with a 2.2% greater likelihood of a meaningful law. If 
Economic Freedom increases by a standard deviation, the probability of a meaningful law increases 
by 15%. Similar magnitude effects are shown for Housing Value: an additional million dollars in new 
homes being built correlates with a 2.7% greater probability of enacting strong restrictions on 
development takings and the standard deviation marginal effect is 20%. Notice that ED9802 and 
N_Local Governments are generally insignificant in Table 4, but Income Inequality now plays a 
significant explanatory role. Specifically, states with greater income inequality are more likely to 
enact no new law or a weak one, but they are less likely to enact meaningful restrictions.27 The value 
of new housing is the most robust of our independent variables, influencing both the decision to enact 
and the type of law.  
Overall, the ordered probit results for category 2 focus attention on three main independent 
variables: economic freedom, new housing dollars, and income (or racial) inequality. A marginal 
increase in Economic Freedom or Housing Value increases the probability of a meaningful law by 
over two percent. By comparison, a marginal increase in Income Inequality decreases the chance of 
                                                 
26 Both the estimated change and the confidence interval are bootstrapped using 1000 replications. The estimated 
change is the mean of the bootstrapped distribution of probability changes given a one standard deviation increase in 
each independent variable, and the confidence interval is based on the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the bootstrapped 
distribution.  
27 We note that when racial diversity is included in place of income inequality (as in Table 3, Model 4), the results 
are largely similar.  
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passing a meaningful law by 3.7 percent. None of the other independent variables are significant 
predictors of a meaningful law. Taken together the results in Tables 3 and 4 imply that the decision to 
update—to pass any law—responds to the intensity of the Kelo backlash and the ability of local 
governments to influence the legislature, but economic freedom and inequality of income or race 
matter more to whether states enact a meaningful versus symbolic reform. 
Finally, although we must be careful interpreting the standard deviation marginal effects, 
they do show an interesting pattern. Consider the two variables that are significant in Column 4 for 
all three categories: Economic Freedom and Housing Value. An increase of one standard deviation in 
either of these variables is associated with a decrease in the probability of no update (category 0) by 
8.4 and 10.6 percent, respectively. In category 1, the same standard deviation increases are estimated 
to decrease the probability of a weak law by 6.6 and 9.4 percent, respectively. And as mentioned the 
effects on category 2 are 15 and 20 percent. Thus, the standard deviation marginal effects suggest 
that categories 0 and 1 are actually more alike than categories 1 and 2, i.e., the factors that have a 
strong negative influence on a state not updating also negatively affect a state updating with a weak 
law. 
5.3 Duration Analysis on Law Days 
Why did some states update sooner than others? Which states can be expected to update their 
laws in the near future? And which states are the least likely ever to update? In our third set of 
estimations, we analyze the timing of states’ responses to Kelo. Estimating the hazard function is the 
technique normally used to analyze the effect of time (and other covariates) on spells or durations 
(Kiefer, 1988). The hazard function, λ(t, x), represents the probability of an event occurring at time t 
with covariates x given that the event has not yet occurred. In the present application, the event is 
whether a state updates its eminent domain law (either weak or meaningful) in the 2.5 years 
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surrounding the Kelo decision.28 The assumption that the covariates have a multiplicative effect on 
the hazard rate results in the proportional hazards model first proposed by Cox (1972),  
(3)  λ(t, x) = h(x)λo(t), 
where λo(t) is the baseline hazard rate and h(x) is a function of the covariates that takes on only 
positive values. The standard is to set h(x) = exβ, where β is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
One can then specify λo(t) parametrically and estimate the effect of time on updating the law. We use 
the Weibull model (Greene, 2003, p. 798), which leads to the following form for the baseline hazard: 
(4)  λo(t) = ptp–1, 
where p is a shape parameter that allows for the hazard to be constant, increasing, or decreasing with 
time.29 All estimates are run on the dependent variable Law Days, which is the number of days since 
January 1, 2005, until the governor’s signature enacting the law, with right truncation at 926 days (or 
2.5 calendar years). 
[TABLE 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents the estimated instantaneous and one standard deviation marginal effects for 
the above Weibull hazard model on Models 4 and 5 from Table 3. Recall that Model 5 substitutes 
Income Inequality for Racial Diversity, ceteris paribus. Overall both specifications exhibit good fit as 
shown by pseudo-R2 and the Chi2 test statistics. The positive estimates on p imply positive duration 
dependence, which means the baseline probability of an update in any period increases with passage 
of time. A negative (positive) estimated marginal effect indicates a shorter (longer) predicted number 
of calendar days until updating.  
                                                 
28 One obvious generalization is to model the choice of symbolic vis-à-vis meaningful as competing risks, especially 
given the results in Table 4 that suggest the two categories of restrictions are different. Competing risks models were 
estimated (available from the authors) which show that the effect of time and covariates on restriction passage is 
independent of Law Type. Thus, although there appear to be critical differences in the legislative response to Kelo in 
terms of the type of update passed, there is not a significant difference in the timing of passage for symbolic and 
meaningful updates.  
29 Alternatively, λo(t) can be estimated semi-parametrically using Cox’s partial likelihood estimator (Greene, 2003, 
p. 799). We produced estimates using Cox’s model (available from the authors), but the Weibull model showed a 
better fit in terms of pseudo-R2 and the Akaike Information Criterion 
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Consider the Model 4 estimates on Economic Freedom, where a one-unit increase in the {1, 
100} index decreases the time of update by almost 15 days, and an increase of one-standard-
deviation decreases the time by more than 111 days. In Model 5, Economic Freedom is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, but as in the results on Law Type, the effect of Housing 
Value works in the same direction and with similar magnitude as Economic Freedom does. The 
instantaneous and standard deviation marginal effect estimates on Housing Value are approximately -
15 and -150 days in Model 4, and slightly smaller in Model 5.30 Next, the Income Inequality and 
Racial Diversity variables are both negative and significant. In Model 5, the respective marginal 
effects are estimated to add 24 and 218 days to the date on which a state updates. A much larger 
magnitude is estimated for Racial Diversity, where a marginal increase adds 130 days and an 
increase of one standard deviation adds nearly 300 days. 
5.4. Predicted versus Actual Timing of Update 
A further advantage of the Weibull hazard model is the ability to predict passage dates in 
order to examine each state’s predicted timing of update. In Table 6 we list each state’s actual and 
predicted values for Law Enact and Law Days, where the predicted values are calculated from Model 
5 in Tables 3 and 5. States are sorted first on Law Enact and second on (Predicted – Actual) of Law 
Days. 
[TABLE 6 about here] 
The first seven states listed in Table 6 have not updated (Law Enact = 0) but have a predicted 
date of passage sooner than the date of right truncation (926 days). In other words, these seven states 
should have already, but have not (yet), updated their eminent domain laws according to the hazard 
model specified in Table 5. Three of these top seven states enacted new laws through citizen 
initiatives or mixed democracy. The four other states—Arkansas, Oklahoma, Washington, and 
                                                 
30 An unreported specification included Housing Price Index; however, the stock of housing again fails tests of 
statistical significance. 
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Mississippi—are “behind schedule” in the sense that our model predicts they would have updated 
their law already but have not. For Washington, our probit model predicts a less than 50% chance of 
an update. But the other three states all exceed 72% predicted probability of a new law. In short, our 
results predict the most likely states to enact in the future are Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Mississippi. 
Also in Table 6, six states have not (yet) updated but are predicted to do so at some date in 
the future. However, none of these six states can be considered to have a strong likelihood of 
updating with legislation. Only Rhode Island and New Jersey exceed 30% predicted probability of 
updating. We would predict Hawaii, Massachusetts, and New York to have the least probability of 
enacting new legislation, in the near future or ever. 
5.5. Robustness Checks 
The exercise in this paper, of quantifying the legislative responses to Kelo into categories of 
discrete choice, has required certain judgment calls. For example, we have focused only on laws 
coming out of the legislative process. But mechanisms of direct and mixed democracy, such as 
citizen initiatives and legislative referenda, respectively, have also been used in many states. As the 
Appendix shows, additional and stronger judgment calls informed our categorization of weak versus 
meaningful reforms. As a robustness check on our categorizations, we estimated all of the above 
empirical models on alternative measures of the states’ responses, as defined by other researchers. 
First, as an alternative to our Law Enact, we counted all states that enacted new laws—by 
legislation, initiative or referendum—following the forthcoming paper by Somin (2008). In total, 41 
states have enacted some form of new law regarding development takings. On this count, we 
obtained probit estimates for the specification in Model 5 of Table 3. In these results, the number of 
local governments is not significant. But like Table 3, states with a greater history of development 
takings, greater economic freedom and higher dollar values of new housing construction are more 
likely to enact some type of reform. The marginal effects are all insignificant. With 41 observations 
in the 1 category, the marginal effects are calculated where the normal density function becomes very 
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flat. Thus, our basic findings hold up to this alternative dependent variable. In fact, overall model fit 
on this alternative variable is higher (the pseudo-R2 is 0.421 up from 0.405 in Table 3). 
Next, we compare Law Type against two alternative measures of the stringency of the new 
laws: first, a five-category variable that quantifies to the letter grades assigned by the 50-State Report 
Card published by the Institute for Justice (Castle Coalition 2007), which is also used in Morriss 
(2008); and second, a three-category variable defined {0,1,2} corresponding to {No Reform, 
Ineffective, Effective} as determined by Somin (2008). These two alternatives incorporate the 
same information in much the same ways, and since the estimates we obtained on these two are 
very similar, we will discuss them together. Compared to the results on Law Type in Table 4, 
model fit on both alternative variables is similar. And, as in Table 4, the stringency of the new 
laws as measured by these alternatives is also empirically determined by economic freedom and 
value of new housing, which are both positive and statistically significant. But against these 
alternative measures, income inequality is insignificant and the number of local governments is 
positive and significant. Thus, with relatively minor differences, our results also remain similar 
when compared to these two alternative measures of stringency. 
Finally, we compare results on Law Days to an alternative variable measuring legislative 
session days rather than calendar days. We first calculated the number of elapsed legislative session 
days from the date of the Kelo ruling (June 23, 2005) and either the date of enactment for the 37 
states that updated or the total session days that had elapsed up to June 12, 2008 for the 13 states that 
did not update. Thus, the alternative dependent variable measures duration in session rather than 
calendar days. Our empirical model has a slightly better fit on this alternative compared to our results 
on Law Days (pseudo R2 = .35 compared to .30 and .33). And unlike our results in Table 5, both 
ED9802 and N_Local Governments are statistically significant, with marginal effects of -10 and -54 
days respectively. In direction and significance, these findings are in agreement with the probit 
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results in Table 3. Otherwise the model performs as our Table 5 results, with economic freedom, 
value of new housing, and income inequality all significant, with the same direction but somewhat 
smaller magnitude. 
6.  Discussion 
As expected, federalism has provided non-uniform protections against infringements of 
individual rights by takings for economic development. This is the first paper to investigate 
empirically the political-economic determinants of how the state legislatures responded to the Kelo 
backlash. Our analysis boils down to three major findings: First, many of the new eminent domain 
laws are more symbolic than meaningful; second, the decision to enact any new law follows a 
different empirical process than the type of law that is passed; and third, we are able to predict those 
states most and least likely to be the next ones to update their eminent domain laws. 
Our first major finding relates to the meaningfulness of any update. Many states chose to 
enact stronger restrictions than those established by the federal baseline. But some of the new state 
laws fail to increase protections against economic development takings. According to our qualitative 
analysis, 14 of the 37 new laws are largely symbolic—favoring loopholes, exemptions, and vague 
definitions of public use and blight, over meaningful restrictions. This should not come as a big 
surprise when considering that legislation is given to compromise, plus organized interests have long 
ago formed around the political benefits imparted by development takings. Many state legislatures 
confront strong incentives toward status quo politics, leaving the powers of eminent domain largely 
intact while voicing reassurances to an agitated populace. 
From our quantitative analysis we conclude that the legislative response to Kelo was 
responsive to measures of the backlash but only in the binary decision whether to pass a new law—
any new law—in order to do something in the face of a popular backlash. The decision to pass a 
meaningful law was more a function of the prevailing political-economic circumstances within each 
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state. Three variables dominate the explanatory power in these latter results: income (or racial) 
inequality, economic freedom, and the value of new housing.  
Critics have argued that economic development takings disproportionately harm minorities 
and the poor. In Section 2 we discussed rational choice reasons for expecting state legislation to do 
little to alleviate that bias. Our empirical findings support that. States with high racial and income 
inequality are less likely to enact meaningful restrictions but more likely to do nothing or pass 
symbolic reform and not as soon. States like New York and New Jersey, which rank in the top seven 
in both racial and income inequality, have not enacted new takings legislation and are unlikely in the 
extreme to do so. In all, state legislative processes afford fewer protections against takings in states 
with high percentages of poor and non-white population. 
 States with greater economic freedom are more likely to update their takings law, with more 
meaningful restrictions and sooner. In states where the populace is accustomed to greater economic 
liberties, governments will face greater resistance to takings for non-traditional uses like tax base and 
job growth. In states accustomed to heavy government involvement, development takings are closer 
to the norm, and policymakers may perceive a greater need preserve all available policy instruments 
toward that end, so that opponents gain less traction in influencing legislation. 
 That being said, the strongest economic influence over legislative responses resides with the 
value of new housing. While we unfortunately do not observe direct lobbying effort levels by 
homebuilders, the observed market value of new housing is a strong indicator of the industry’s stake 
in restricting development takings. As documented earlier in the paper, homebuilders and realtors 
opposed the Kelo ruling. Our results are consistent with the idea that home builder groups exert more 
influence in states with more ongoing home construction and that legislatures respond with 
meaningful restrictions and sooner. An alternative interpretation is that new home construction is an 
indicator of economic growth, so that states with more current growth are more likely to update 
eminent domain laws so as not to suppress continued growth. 
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 Our third major results relates to the timing of states’ decisions. The duration model helps 
form expectations about future moves by states that had not yet updated. Five states in particular 
have not yet enacted legislation but are predicted by the model to do so within the reasonably near 
future. These five “ripest” states are Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Washington, Mississippi and Rhode 
Island. In contrast, Hawaii, Nevada, Maryland, New York and New Jersey are unlikely in the 
extreme ever to enact restrictions on development takings. Furthermore, of these five states, the latter 
three are among the ten most active states in takings for private-to-private transfer (Somin 2007), and 
they are the only three of these most active states that have not updated takings reform after Kelo. 
 30
References 
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. 2000. “Redistributive Public Employment,” 
Journal of Urban Economics, 48, 219-241. 
Benson, Bruce. 2005. “The Mythology of the Holdout as a Justification for Eminent Domain and 
Public Provision of Roads,” The Independent Review, X:2, Fall, pp.165-194. 
Berliner, Dana. 2006. Opening the Floodgates: Eminent Domain Abuse in the Post Kelo World. 
Washington, DC: The Institute for Justice. 
Berliner, Dana. 2003. Public Power, Private Gain. Washington, DC: The Institute for Justice. 
Besley, T. & Case,. A. 1995. Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence 
from Gubernatorial Term Limits. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 60, 769-798. 
Boylan, Richard T., and Cheryl X. Long. 2003. “Measuring Public Corruption in the American 
States: A Survey of State House Reporters,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 3:4 (Winter):420-
38. 
Castle Coalition. 2007. 50-State Report Card Tracking Eminent Domain Legislation Since Kelo. 
Available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf. 
Council of State Governments. Various years. The Book of the States, Lexington, KY. 
Cox, D.R. 1972. “Regression Models and Life Tables.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Series B 34:187-220. 
de Figueiredo, R. (2003). Budget Institutions and Political Insulation: Why States Adopt the Item Veto. 
Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2677-2701. 
Denzau, Arthur T. and Michael C. Munger. 1986. Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized 
Interests Get Represented. American Political Science Review 80(1): 89-106. 
Eggan, Dan and Amy Goldstein. 2007. “Justice Weighed Firing 1 in 4,” The Washington Post, May 
17, p.A01. 
Edelman, Murray. 1964. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 31
Edelman, Murray. 1971. Politics as Symbolic Action. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co. 
FDIC. 2006. “Statistics of Banking,” various issues. Online at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/. 
Accessed September 2006. 
Fischel, William A. 2004. “Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price,” in Charles K. 
Rowley (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Volume 2, pp.549-53. 
Fischel, William A. (2001). The Homevoter Hypothesis, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Glaeser, Edward L. and Raven E. Saks. (2006). Corruption in America. Journal of Public Economics, 
90, 1053-1072. 
Greene, W.H. 2005. Econometric Analysis, 5th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hanssen, F. A. (2002). On the Politics of Judicial Selection: Lawyers and State Campaigns for the Merit 
Plan. Public Choice, 110, 79-97. 
Hynes, Richard M., Anup Malani, and Eric A. Posner. 2004. “The Political Economy of Property 
Exemption Laws,” The Journal of Law & Economics, 47:1, 19-43. 
Karabegovich and McMahon 2006. Economic Freedom in North America. Fraswer Institute. 
Available online: www.freetheworld.com. Accessed November 2006. 
Kiefer, N.M. 1988. “Economic Analysis of Duration Data and Hazard Functions.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 26:646-679. 
Leip, Dave. 2007. “Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections,” 1988-2004 historical data. 
Available online: www.uselectionatlas.org. Accessed March 2007. 
López, E. J. (2003). Term Limits: Causes and Consequences. Public Choice, 114, 1-56. 
López, E. J. (2002). Congressional Voting on Term Limits. Public Choice, 112, 405-31. 
López, E.J. and Jewell, R. Todd. 2007. Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States, and 
Congressional Term Limits. Public Choice (forthcoming) 
López, E.J. and Totah, Sasha M. 2007. Kelo and its Discontents: The Best (or Worst) Thing to 
Happen to Property Rights? The Independent Review, Winter 2007. 
 32
López, E. J., Kerekes, C. & Johnson, G. 2007. Make Property Rights Stronger: Limit Eminent 
Domain, in Russell S. Sobel (ed), Unleashing Capitalism, West Virginia Public Policy 
Foundation, 2007. 
McCormick, Robert E. and Robert D. Tollison. 1981. Politicians, Legislation and the Economy: An 
Inquiry into the Interest Group Theory of Government. Boston: Martin-Nijhoff. 
Morriss, Andrew P. “Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo,” 
University of Illinois Law & Economics Working Paper LE07-037. Available at SSRN 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113582. 
OFHEO. 2007. “House Price Index,” Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Online at 
http://www.ofheo.gov/HPI.asp. Accessed November 2006.  
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Peltzman, Sam. 1976, Toward a More General Theory of Economic Regulation. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 19: 211-40. 
Pickel, Mary Lynn (Counsel of Record). 2004. “Brief of Amici Curiae: The National Association of 
Home Builders and the National Association of Realtors In Support of the Petitioners,” Kelo v. 
City of New London 04-108. Available at 
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/04-108/04-108.mer.ami.nahb.pdf. 
Sandefur, Timothy. 2006. The ‘Backlash’ So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent Domain 
Reform? Michigan State Law Review. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=868539 . 
Somin, Ilya. 2008. The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, George Mason 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 07-14, SSRN 976298. 
Somin, Ilya. 2007. Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo. 
Supreme Court Economic Review , vol.15, pp.183-271. 
Somin, Ilya. 2004. “Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development 
Takings, and the Future of Public Use,” Michigan State Law Review 2004(4): 1005-40. 
 33
Staley, Samuel R. and John P. Blair. 2005. Eminent Domain, Private Property, and Redevelopment: 
An Economic Development Analysis. Reason Foundation Policy Study no. 331 (February): 1-44. 
StataCorp. 2005. Stata Statistical Software: Release 9. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP. 
Stigler, George S. 1971. “A Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2:1 (Spring) p.1-21. 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2006. “Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits,” Table 2—United 
States, Region, Division, and State. Online at 
http://www.census.gov/const/www/C40/table2.html#annual. Accessed November 2006. 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2004. “Journey to Work: 2000,” Economics and Statistics Administration, 
March 2004, Table 5, p.9. 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2002. “Census of Governments,” Governments Division, various tables. Online 
at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/cog2002.html. Accessed September 2006. 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000a. “Population Estimates,” Population Division, various tables. Online at 
http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html. Accessed September 2006. 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000b. “State and Local Government Finances,” Governments Division, 
various tables. Online at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html. Accessed September 
2006. 
U. S. Census Bureau. 2000c. “Density Using Land Area For States, Counties, Metropolitan Areas, 
and Places” various tables. Online at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/density.html. Accessed September 2006. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. 2003. “National Resources Inventory,” National Resources 
Conservation Service, 2003. 
Wolfe, R. and W. Gould. 1998. “An Approximate Likelihood-Ratio Test for Ordinal Response 
Models.” Stata Technical Bulletin 42:24-27. 
 34
Table 1 
Dependent Variables—By State and Summary Statistics 
 
 State Name Law Enact Law Type Law Days 
1 Alabama 1 2 215 
2 Alaska 1 2 551 
3 Arizona 0 0 926 
4 Arkansas 0 0 926 
5 California 1 1 648 
6 Colorado 1 2 522 
7 Connecticut 1 1 805 
8 Delaware 1 2 202 
9 Florida 1 2 496 
10 Georgia 1 2 520 
11 Hawaii 0 0 926 
12 Idaho 1 2 445 
13 Illinois 1 1 575 
14 Indiana 1 2 448 
15 Iowa 1 2 561 
16 Kansas 1 1 503 
17 Kentucky 1 2 452 
18 Louisiana 0 0 926 
19 Maine 1 2 529 
20 Maryland 1 1 858 
21 Massachusetts 0 0 926 
22 Michigan 1 2 628 
23 Minnesota 1 2 504 
24 Mississippi 0 0 926 
25 Missouri 1 2 560 
26 Montana 1 2 867 
27 Nebraska 1 1 529 
28 Nevada 1 2 874 
29 New Hampshire 1 2 536 
30 New Jersey 0 0 926 
31 New Mexico 1 2 853 
32 New York 0 0 926 
33 North Carolina 1 2 587 
34 North Dakota 1 2 855 
35 Ohio 1 1 320 
36 Oklahoma 0 0 926 
37 Oregon 0 0 926 
38 Pennsylvania 1 1 489 
39 Rhode Island 0 0 926 
40 South Carolina 0 0 926 
41 South Dakota 1 2 413 
42 Tennessee 1 1 515 
43 Texas 1 1 244 
44 Utah 1 1 445 
45 Vermont 1 1 530 
46 Virginia 1 2 854 
47 Washington 0 0 926 
48 West Virginia 1 1 521 
49 Wisconsin 1 1 454 
50 Wyoming 1 2 789 
 Count if = 0 13 13 n/a 
 Count if = 1 37 14 n/a 
 Count if = 2 n/a 23 n/a 
 Mean .74 1.2 559.4 
 Standard Deviation .443 .832 29.8 
 Skew -1.13 -0.397 0.241 
 Kurtosis -0.76 -1.44 -0.195 
Notes: Law Enact is coded 1 if the state updated its eminent domain law, 0 otherwise. Law Type is coded 1 for a 
symbolic update, 2 for meaningful restriction, 0 otherwise. Law Days is the number of days after January 1, 2005 until 
a state updated, with right truncation at 926 days (2.5 years); descriptive statistics on Law Days include only the 37 
states that updated. 
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Table 2 
Variable Names, Explanations, Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Category Variable Description (Source) Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Backlash Variables Newspapers Lexis/Nexis™ stories per 100,000 people with keywords eminent 
domain, legislation and legislature, from 01/01/04 to 09/15/06 
50 .912 .968 0 5.32 
 ED0506 Properties threatened or condemned per 100,000 people, 06/30/05 to 
06/30/06, from news stories (Berliner 2006) 
50 2.76 7.72 0 43.45 
 ED9802 Properties threatened or condemned per 100,000 people between 
1998 and 2002, from news stories (Berliner 2003) 
50 1.808 3.61 0 20.01 
Policy and Policymaker 
Variables 
Property Tax_Local Local governments’ property tax revenue, $1000s per capita, 2003-
04 fiscal year (U.S. Census 2000) 
50 9.64 4.04 2.11 20.98 
 Property Tax_State State government’s property tax revenue per capita, $1000s per 
capita, 2003-04 fiscal year (U.S. Census Bureau 2000b) 
50 61.49 128.3 0 721.7 
 Commute Times Average minutes commuting to work (U.S. Census Bureau 2004) 50 23.66 3.45 15.8 31.7 
 Corruption Rate Federal convictions of state and local policymakers per 1,000 
people, annual average for 1976-2002 (Glaeser and Saks 2006) 
50 27.8 13.34 7.4 64.3 
 N_Local Governments Number of local governments per capita (U.S. Census Bureau 2002) 50 .640 .891 .016 5.38 
 Economic Freedom Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of North America index, overall 
score, “subnational” grouping, annual average 1981-2003, rescaled 
from original to range 1 to 100 increasing in freedom (Karabegovic 
and McMahon 2006) 
50 69.1 6.98 54.0 82.17 
Housing Price Index Average of quarterly values, 1975Q1-2006Q2 (OFHEO 2007)  50 169.1 35.9 118.4 292.1 State Political and 
Economic Characteristics Housing Value Dollar value ($millions) new home construction authorizations, 
2004 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006) 
50 5.84 7.62 .362 36.96 
 FDIC Home Loans Value Dollar value ($millions) of FDIC institution loans (FDIC 2002) 50 3.24 7.65 .280 43.22 
 Income Inequality = [(percent of families earning less than 25K)*(percent of families 
earning more than 100K)], for year 2004. 
50 29.93 6.44 17.55 44.35 
 Racial Diversity [(10000 - ∑si2) / 1,000], where si is i’s race/ethnicity share as 
percent of state population. Increasing in diversity (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2000a) 
50 3.80 1.65 .727 7.64 
 Race Percent Non-white = [1 - percent of population white] (U.S. Census Bureau 2000a) 50 25.47 15.16 3.9 76.7 
 Third Party Voting Percent of statewide vote for third party presidential candidates, 
average for five elections 1988 through 2004 (Leip 2007) 
50 7.64 2.12 3.94 13.49 
 Land Percent Rural Percent of state land rural (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 2003) 50 74.2 18.06 14.2 95.3 
 Population Density Persons per square mile (U.S. Census 2000c) 50 159 204.8 .991 995.9 
Political Institution and 
Organization Variables 
Legislature Size Number of legislators per 1,000 capita. (Council of State 
Governments) 
50 6.02 6.91 .335 32.63 
 Legislature Ratio Ratio of size of House to size of Senate. (Council of State 
Governments) 
49 2.91 2.17 1 16.67 
 Unified Government =1 if executive of same party as legislative majority, = 0 otherwise 
(Council of State Governments) 
49 .346 .480 0 1 




Probit Results Reporting Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable is Law Enact 
 
 
Category Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Backlash Variables Newspapers 
 
 .108 * 
(.065) 
    
 ED9802 
 
 .022 * 
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State Political & 
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(.013) 
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(.012) 
Characteristics FDIC Home Loans Value 
 
  .006 
(.009) 
   



























 Land Percent Rural 
 































    
Model Statistics Chi2 test statistic 36.48 13.85 23.43 15.42 20.45 
 Prob>Chi2 .000 .128 .015 .085 .025 
 Pseudo-R2 .438 .205 .400 .389 .405 
 N 49 50 49 50 50 
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated at sample medians. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors appear in 
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** for ≥99% for ** for ≥95% and * for ≥90% confidence. 
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Table 4 
Ordered Probit Reporting Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable is Law Type 
(Reporting Specification 5 from Table 3) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 






+ 1 std. deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
ED9802 -.012 .010 -.042 [-0.103, 0.020] 
Property Tax_Local -.005 .015 -.021 [-0.132, 0.090] 
Corruption Rate -.003 .005 -.036 [-0.142, 0.071] 
N_Local Governments -.166 .114 -.112 # [-0.217, -0.068] 
Economic Freedom -.015 ** .007 -.084 # [-0.149, -0.019] 
Housing Value -.018 ** .008 -.106 # [-0.186, -0.026] 
Income Inequality  .025 * .013  .201 [-0.030, 0.432] 
Third Party Voting -.027 .036 -.053 [-0.175, 0.070] 
Land Percent Rural  .00006 .003  .001 [-0.109, 0.111] 
Legislature Size -.005 .008 -.031 [-0.132, 0.070] 
 
Law Type = 1 (symbolic) 
  
ED9802 -.006 .005 -.026 # [-0.026, -0.025] 
Property Tax_Local -.003 .007 -.012 # [-0.012, -0.011] 
Corruption Rate -.001 .003 -.021 # [-0.021, -0.020] 
N_Local Governments -.081 .075 -.102 # [-0.121, -0.084] 
Economic Freedom -.007 .005 -.066 # [-0.073, -0.058] 
Housing Value -.009 ** .004 -.094 # [-0.101, -0.078] 
Income Inequality  .012 * .007  .022 [-0.014, 0.057] 
Third Party Voting -.013 .019 -.034 # [-0.036, -0.033] 
Land Percent Rural  .00003 .002  .0006 [-0.001, 0.001] 
Legislature Size -.002 .004 -.018 # [-0.018, -0.017] 
 
Law Type = 2 (meaningful) 
  
ED9802  .019 .014  .067 [-0.034, 0.168] 
Property Tax_Local  .008 .022  .033 [-0.143, 0.209] 
Corruption Rate  .004 .007  .057 [-0.130, 0.243] 
N_Local Governments  .248 .179  .214 [-0.061, 0.489] 
Economic Freedom  .022 ** .010  .150 # [0.014, 0.286] 
Housing Value  .027 *** .010  .200 # [0.054, 0.346] 
Income Inequality -.037 ** .018 -.222 # [-0.401, -0.044] 
Third Party Voting  .041 .054  .087 [-0.136, 0.309] 
Land Percent Rural -.00009 .005 -.002 [-0.165, 0.162] 
Legislature Size  .007 .012 
 
 .049  [-0.117, 0.216] 
Chi2 test statistic 24.89    
Prob>Chi2 0.006    
Pseudo-R2 0.188    
N 50    
 
Notes: Estimated Pr (Law Type = {0, 1, 2}) = {.268, .277, .455}. In Column 2 (the case of marginal effects 
evaluated as slopes of the probability function), significance levels are indicated by *** for  ≥ 99%, ** for ≥ 95%, 
and * for ≥ 90% confidence. In Column 4 (marginal effects evaluated as probability changes due to an increase of 




Weibull Hazard Model: Estimated Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable is Law Days 
(Reporting Specifications 4 and 5 from Table 3) 
 
 Model 4 Marginal Effects Model 5 Marginal Effects 
 ∂[Law Days]/∂x 
(Std. Error) 
+ 1 std. deviation 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
∂[Law Days]/∂x 
(Std. Error) 









































































































Chi2 test statistic 39.39 35.49 
Prob>Chi2 .0000 .0001 
Pseudo-R2 .3026 .3281 
N 50 50 
 
Notes: Mean of predicted Law Days = 712.34. In the case of marginal effects evaluated as slopes of the hazard 
function in terms of Law Days, significance levels are indicated by *** for  ≥ 99%,  ** for ≥ 95%, and * for ≥ 90% 
confidence.  In the case of marginal effects evaluated as changes in Law Days due to an increase of one standard 
















Law Days  
(Predicted – Actual) 
1 Arizona + 0 .855 926 669 -257 
2 Arkansas 0 .725 926 687 -239 
3 Oklahoma 0 .735 926 687 -239 
4 South Carolina + 0 .592 926 750 -176 
5 Washington 0 .498 926 760 -166 
6 Oregon + 0 .254 926 877 -49 
7 Mississippi 0 .807 926 896 -30 
8 Hawaii 0 .084 926 927 1 
9 Massachusetts 0 .191 926 943 17 
10 Louisiana + 0 .132 926 988 62 
11 Rhode Island 0 .305 926 1001 75 
12 New Jersey 0 .346 926 1005 79 
13 New York 0 .048 926 1163 237 
14 Montana 1 .988 867 649 -218 
15 North Dakota 1 1 855 654 -201 
16 Wyoming 1 .997 789 621 -168 
17 Florida 1 1 496 340 -156 
18 Nebraska 1 .996 529 395 -134 
19 Iowa 1 .996 561 470 -91 
20 Connecticut 1 .633 805 732 -73 
21 Maine 1 .995 529 456 -73 
22 Virginia 1 .551 854 791 -63 
23 Missouri 1 .992 560 509 -51 
24 Kansas 1 .999 503 519 16 
25 New Hampshire 1 .999 536 553 17 
26 Indiana 1 .999 448 467 19 
27 Wisconsin 1 .914 454 481 27 
28 Maryland 1 .956 858 889 31 
29 North Carolina 1 .819 587 625 38 
30 Minnesota 1 .975 504 563 59 
31 Nevada 1 .785 874 936 62 
32 Vermont 1 .997 530 595 65 
33 South Dakota 1 .999 413 479 66 
34 Michigan 1 .598 628 747 119 
35 Alaska 1 .812 551 675 124 
36 Tennessee 1 .796 515 658 143 
37 Illinois 1 .713 575 727 152 
38 Colorado 1 .895 522 693 171 
39 Utah 1 .938 445 624 179 
40 Pennsylvania 1 .817 489 681 192 
41 California 1 .985 648 845 197 
42 Georgia 1 .794 520 737 217 
43 Texas 1 .999 244 476 232 
44 New Mexico 1 .136 853 1121 268 
45 Kentucky 1 .725 452 723 271 
46 Idaho 1 .963 445 736 291 
47 Ohio 1 .882 320 658 338 
48 West Virginia 1 .874 521 874 353 
49 Delaware 1 .579 202 759 557 
50 Alabama 1 .395 215 806 591 
Notes: States are sorted first on Law Enact then on (Predicted – Actual) Law Days. Predicted values for Law Enact 
and Law Days are calculated from Column 5 of Table 3 and Table 5, respectively. + indicates new law through 




Categorization of the Dependent Variable Law Type 
 
Does the law: 
1. Prohibit takings for tax revenue, jobs, economic growth, or general economic health (e.g., by 
more narrowly defining public use)? 
2. Prohibit takings for transfer to private interest, or for public use that is merely a pretext for 
private? 
3. Restrict only for “stated public purpose” or a “recognized public use” 
4. Prohibit condemnations even for blighted properties/areas? 
5. Require compensation greater than market value? 
6. Require governments to incur extra procedural costs (e.g., greater public notice, more public 
hearings, negotiation in good faith with landowners, and approval by elected governing bodies)? 
7. Give property owners right of first refusal (in the event the government does not use the property 
as stated upon condemnation), or impose a waiting period on transferring to private interests? 
8. Define blight more narrowly (e.g., as detrimental to public health/safety)? 
9. Define “public use” more narrowly? 
10. Impose an expiration on blight designations? 
11. Use language of solely or primarily for economic development? 
12. Create temporary moratorium? 
13. Create task force/study commission in lieu of statutory change? 
14. Create exemption for blight, where blight is broadly defined? 
15. Create exemptions for previously created redevelopment districts or urban renewal? 
16. Create exemptions for removing threat to public health/safety? 
17. Create exemptions for other vague reasons? 
18. Create broader definition of blight? 
 
For each criterion, answer “no” is coded 0 and “yes” is coded 1. Let Si = ∑(criteria 1 through 10) 
– ∑(criteria 11-18). Then, 
 
Law Type  = 1 if Si  ≤  0  (N = 13); 
  = 2 if Si  >  0. (N = 21). 
 
Stated verbally, if: 
 
Law Type  = 0 then the state did not update its eminent domain law after Kelo; 
  = 1 then the state enacted weak or largely symbolic legislation; 






Coding of the Dependent Variable Law Type
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connectic Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland MassachusMichigan MinnesotaMississippMissouri
Legislation passed & signed? (Law Enact ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Referendum/initiative passed? 1 1 1 1 1
1 Prohibit takings tax/jobs/development 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Prohibit takings private/pretext 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Restrict tkgs to “stated public” 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Prohibit takings blighted 1
5 Require addl/compensation 1 1 1 1
6 Require extra procedural costs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 First refusal or wait period 1 1 1
8 Define blight narrow 1 1 1 1 1
9 Define public use narrow 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Impose expiration on blight
11 Use solely /primarily 1 1
12 Impose moratorium
13 Only create task force/commission
14 Exempt blight 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 Exempt previous RDA/UR 1
16 Exempt public health/safety 1 1 1
17 Exempt vague 1 1 1 1 1
18 Define blight more broadly 1 1
c1 = sum items 1-10 3 2 4 1 4 2 1 6 5 2 1 4 5 2 3 2 0 5 3 4
c2 = sum items 11-18 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 3 2 1 0 1 1 2
S = c1 - c2 (greater is more restrictive) 3 1 4 -2 4 0 1 5 5 2 -1 4 4 -1 1 1 0 4 2 2
Law Type 2 2 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 2 1 0 2 2 0 2
Montana Nebraska Nevada New HampNew JerseNew MexicNew York North CaroNorth DakoOhio Oklahoma Oregon PennsylvaRhode IslaSouth CaroSouth DakTennesse Texas Utah Vermont Virginia WashingtoWest Virgi WisconsinWyoming
Legislation passed & signed? (Law Enact ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Referendum/initiative passed? 1 1 1 1 1
1 Prohibit takings tax/jobs/development 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Prohibit takings private/pretext 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Restrict tkgs to “stated public” 1 1 1 1
4 Prohibit takings blighted 1
5 Require addl/compensation
6 Require extra procedural costs 1 1 1 1 1
7 First refusal or wait period 1 1 1 1 1
8 Define blight narrow 1 1 1 1
9 Define public use narrow 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Impose expiration on blight
11 Use solely /primarily 1 1 1 1
12 Impose moratorium 1
13 Only create task force/commission 1
14 Exempt blight 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 Exempt previous RDA/UR 1 1
16 Exempt public health/safety 1 1 1 1
17 Exempt vague 1 1 1 1 1
18 Define blight more broadly 1
c1 = sum items 1-10 3 1 4 2 1 2 4 0 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 6 2 1 8
c2 = sum items 11-18 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 4 1 0 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 1
S = c1 - c2 (greater is more restrictive) 3 0 2 1 1 1 4 -2 -2 0 3 -1 -1 0 0 5 0 0 7
Law Type 2 1 2 2 0 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 2
